Prior research shows grocery stores reduce prices to compete with Walmart Supercenters. This study finds evidence that the competitive effects of two other big box retailers -Costco and Walmart-owned Sam's Club -are quite different. Using city-level panel grocery price data matched with a unique data set on Walmart and warehouse club locations, we find that Costco entry is associated with higher grocery prices at incumbent retailers, and that the effect is strongest in cities with small populations and high grocery store densities. This is consistent with incumbents competing with Costco along non-price dimensions such as product quality or quality of the shopping experience. We find no evidence that Sam's Club entry affects grocery stores' prices, consistent with Sam's Club's focus on small businesses instead of consumers.
INTRODUCTION
Firms do not compete on price and quantity alone. They also compete by innovating, experimenting, and differentiating their products. In retail, they can compete by changing the mix of distribution services and amenities that accompany the goods being offered as well. This paper presents evidence that incumbent grocers charge higher prices in response to competition from the discount wholesaler Costco. This is consistent with incumbents electing not to compete on price, and instead focusing on appealing to less price sensitive consumers by offering, for instance, higher quality products or a more pleasant shopping experience. The data suggest that Sam's Club, meanwhile, does not affect grocery store prices. Ellickson (2007:45) points out three major changes in grocery retail during the twentieth century. The first was the rise of the chain store in the early 1900s. The second was the introduction and diffusion of the supermarket in the middle of the century. The third was the "adoption of technology-intensive distribution systems in the 1980s and 1990s" (Ellickson 2007:45) . To this we might add a trend that accelerated in the 1990s: expansion by "big box" discounters and wholesalers like Walmart, Costco, and Target into the grocery business. In 2010, Supermarket News reported that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. was North America's largest grocery retailer, Kroger was North America's second-largest, and Costco Wholesale Corp. was North America's third-largest. 1 This has increased variety in the grocery business. Citing data from the Food Marketing Institute, Ellickson (2007:522) points out that "the number of products offered per store increased from about 14,000 in 1980 to over 30,000 by 2004."
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. again topped the Fortune 500 in 2010. Costco-categorized by Fortune as a "specialty retailer"-was ranked #25. Also in the top 50 were big box retailers Home Depot (#29), Lowe's (#42), and Best Buy (#45), and general merchandisers Target (#30) and Sears Holdings (#48). 2010 revenues for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. were higher than 2010 revenue for these other firms combined. 2 Motivated by this trend toward nontraditional retail outlets, a growing body of research examines the effects of Walmart on a number of outcomes, including prices (Basker 2005b; Basker and Noel 2009; Volpe and Lavoie 2007; Leibtag 2007, 2009 ), labor market outcomes (Basker 2005a; Hicks 2007; Neumark et al. 2008; Dube et al. 2007; Basker 2006) , poverty (Goetz and Swaminathan 2006) , small business activity (Sobel and Dean 2008) , social capital (Goetz and Rupasingha 2006; Carden et al. 2009a) , leisure activities (Carden and Courtemanche 2009) , traditional values (Carden et al. 2009b) , and obesity (Courtemanche and Carden 2011) . 3 However, to our knowledge no previous research has used nationwide data to explore the effects of other big box chains. We provide a first step toward filling this void. Basker (2005a) , Volpe and Lavoie (2007) , Leibtag (2007, 2009) , and Basker and Noel (2009) present evidence that Walmart discount stores and Supercenters reduce market prices, both directly through their price advantages and indirectly through their influence on competitors. The competitive response need not be to reduce prices, however, as retail firms also compete on margins like distribution services, assortment, and convenience. In two papers on the structure of grocery retail, Ellickson (2004 Ellickson ( , 2007 argues that grocery stores compete by offering greater variety, which requires investments in distribution centers that increases quality by raising fixed costs, but not marginal costs (Ellickson 2004:524) . Incumbents incur larger fixed costs to build better distribution networks; according to Ellickson (2004 Ellickson ( , 2007 , this explains why larger markets have higher-quality products and greater selection rather than more firms. 4 We estimate the effects of Costco and Sam's Club on grocery prices using a unique dataset of warehouse club entry dates and locations matched with city-level panel data on prices of a range of items from the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association Cost of Living Index (ACCRA COLI). 5 The ACCRA COLI does not sample warehouse clubs, so our estimates capture the competitive effects of Costco and Sam's Club on prices charged by incumbent grocers in a market. Controlling for Walmart Supercenters, product-by-year fixed effects, city fixed effects, and lagged price, a new Costco increases competitors' grocery prices by a statistically significant 1.4% in the short run and 2.7% in the long run, while the impact of a new Sam's Club is small and insignificant. The results also provide further evidence that Walmart Supercenters reduce grocery prices.
We conduct a falsification test and a wide range of robustness checks in order to increase confidence that the estimates reflect causal effects rather than spurious correlations. We also stratify by product and product type and find that Costco's effect is somewhat larger for the goods for which ACCRA's data collection process allows product quality to vary across stores.
We interpret this as preliminary evidence that firms' responses to Costco entry include some competition along the quality dimension. Finally, we test for heterogeneity on the basis of market characteristics and show that Costco has the strongest effects in cities with low populations and a large number of grocery stores per capita. Our results are consistent with the findings of Basker (2005a) , Volpe and Lavoie (2007) , and Basker and Noel (2009) that Walmart Supercenters lower prices, Barber and Tietje's (2004) finding that incumbent firms might raise 4 Ellickson (2004 Ellickson ( , 2007 notes that there is still a low-price, low-quality fringe in these markets. 5 ACCRA is now the Council for Community and Economic Research (www.c2er.org).
prices as a strategic response to new entry, and Ellickson's (2004 Ellickson's ( , 2007 models whereby grocery stores compete on the basis of quality and improved distribution networks. Further, these results suggest that Costco might capture price-sensitive shoppers and leave incumbents to serve shoppers who are less price sensitive.
THEORY AND BACKGROUND

Retail Price Responses to Competitive Pressure
The market is a process of harmonizing buyers' and sellers' plans; under ceteris paribus conditions, these plans will coordinate fully until equilibrium is obtained and no one has an incentive to change his or her actions (cf. Hayek 1948:41-45) . At issue is whether entrepreneurship upsets the process (Schumpeter 1942) or constitutes the process (Kirzner 1973) .
For Schumpeter (1942) , the entrepreneur is a dis-equilibrator who changes the underlying pattern of preferences, technology, and resources. For Kirzner (1973) , the entrepreneur is an equilibrator who adjusts the production process to the underlying pattern of preferences, technology, and resources. Regardless, entrepreneurship and competition are processes of active adjustment rather than passive observance and acquiescence to exogenously-changing conditions (Klein 2010:54-55) . Boudreaux (1994) analyzes the ways in which Schumpeter and Kirzner emphasize different aspects of the adjustment process, noting that the Kirznerian entrepreneurial function and the Schumpeterian entrepreneurial function are complements, not substitutes. Boudreaux (1994: 57) discusses the complementarity specifically: "Whereas Schumpeter highlighted those activities that change the givens, Kirzner's focus is on the activities that actually establish equilibrium prices given the particular givens." 6 6 See Boudreaux (1994:56ff) for a graphical discussion of the complementarity.
The things we hold constant under the ceteris paribus conditions that are used to isolate and analyze pure price competition are often the very elements of the competitive process that are most important (Boudreaux 1994 :53, citing Schumpeter 1942 . Incumbents' reactions to warehouse club entry illustrate the processes of dis-equilibrating and re-equilibrating competition along the margins that make up the retail offer. In this case, we observe dis-equilibrating entry by large-scale retailers like Walmart and Costco. The price effects that we observe over the long run represent the re-equilibrating responses of incumbents who have to innovate in response to competitors' entry.
Our finding that neither Costco nor Sam's Club reduces competitors' prices -and in fact that Costco increases them -might be surprising in light of evidence on the price effects of Walmart discount stores and Supercenters. Basker (2005a) , Leibtag (2007, 2009) , and Basker and Noel (2009) have shown not only that retailers like Walmart sell goods at considerable discounts, but also that incumbent retailers reduce their prices when faced with competition from new Walmart stores. Matsa (2011) finds that competitors tend to have fewer inventory shortfalls in response to Walmart's competition, and non-price margins like quality might be the most important aspects of the Costco effect.
The theoretical effect of new competitive pressure on retail prices is ambiguous because the retail offer is multi-dimensional. When consumers are deciding whether to buy something from a particular retailer, they are evaluating a bundle that includes a good, a level of service, a location, assortment and variety, a shopping ambiance, and a degree of risk regarding whether the store will have what the shopper seeks. The good is the only part of the mix that is priced explicitly. Other aspects of the retail offer are priced implicitly.
Models of the economics of retail are summarized by Betancourt (2004) . Retailers face the following inverse demand function, adapted from Betancourt (2004:23) :
where P is price, Q is quantity, D is a vector of distribution services, W is consumer income, and P' is a vector of other prices that might affect the market for (say) bread. Price is non-increasing in Q and non-decreasing in the elements of D and W; its relationship to P i ' is ambiguous a priori.
In a market where there are n competitors, firm i will face an inverse demand function in which its price is also a function of the quantities, distribution services, and prices offered by potential competitors:
More fully, every aspect of a firm's offer will change in response to competing firms' decisions regarding price, quantity, distribution services, and the prices of other goods, yielding the following general inverse demand function:
The direct effects of competitors' decisions on a firm's prices might be straightforward:
all else equal, a firm will compete by lowering price in response to a competitor's improved service, ambiance, or other amenities. The sensitivity of the other components of the retail offer to competitors' decisions, though, means that the effect of entry on observed prices will be ambiguous a priori. Super Walmart, which specializes in low prices and low amenities, will generate a different response than will a retailer like Whole Foods Market that specializes in high amenities and selection of natural and organic products. Similarly, Costco might offer a bundle of prices and distribution services that induces incumbents to make price-increasing changes to their operations, Super Walmart might offer a bundle of prices and distribution services that induces incumbents to make price-reducing changes to their operations, and Sam's Club might offer a bundle or prices and distribution services that leaves incumbents' prices unchanged.
Costco, for example, might capture price-sensitive consumers who are willing to drive longer distances for a less pleasant shopping experience in order to obtain deep discounts. In this case, we would expect to see prices rise among incumbent grocers as they lose shoppers who are more price-sensitive and serve shoppers who are less price-sensitive.
According to Ellickson (2004 Ellickson ( , 2007 , large grocery chains compete on the basis of quality and variety, which requires substantial fixed investments in retail services. This is also consistent with Hollander's (1960:37) discussion of "the wheel of retailing," whereby "new types of retailing frequently start off with crude facilities, little prestige, and a reputation for cutting prices and margins. 7 As they mature, they often acquire more expensive buildings, provide more elaborate services, impose higher margins, and become vulnerable to new competition." Hollander describes this as "a ratchet process" through which "merchants in any established branch of trade tend to provide increasingly elaborate services at increasingly higher margins" (Hollander 1960:38) . As firms move along the wheel toward "increasingly elaborate services," they provide incentives for innovators and entrepreneurs to introduce newer retail forms. Innovators and entrepreneurs introducing new retail forms in turn put pressure on incumbents to provide higher-quality services in order to stay competitive.
Price Effects of Big Box Retailers
Hausman and Leibtag (2007) examine a basket of 20 food items and find that prices at supercenters, mass merchandisers, and club stores (which include Costco and Sam's Club) are 5%-48% lower than prices at conventional retailers such as supermarkets. Walmart's food prices 7 We thank John Planchon for directing us to this work.
are lower by 8-27% according to data from studies discussed by Hausman and Leibtag (2009 Warehouse clubs, which offer steep discounts on goods purchased in bulk to customers who pay a small membership fee, represent a fundamental change in shopping technology and could plausibly have even more dramatic effects on competitors' prices than Walmart. On the other hand, incumbents could decide that warehouse clubs' price advantages are so large that competition along the price dimension is futile, leading them to compete by providing higher-end products or shopping experiences and raising prices.
Sam's Club and Costco: Differences
Warehouse clubs are important because they represent another step in a series of changes in shopping technology. The key differences between mass merchandisers like Walmart and grocery stores is that stores like Walmart carry more product categories with less variation within each category (Fox et al. 2004:S36) . This is even truer for warehouse clubs. In contrast to conventional supermarkets and mass merchandisers, they carry a relatively limited selection of name-brand or house-brand goods (e.g. Member's Mark at Sam's Club and Kirkland's at Costco). Supermarkets tend at times to carry brands in great variety while superstores tend to carry brands in more limited varieties. Warehouse clubs are more likely to carry an even less diversified product line: they may carry only one brand of spaghetti sauce, for example. 9
While all warehouse clubs share these general features, notable distinctions exist within the warehouse club category. In particular, the two leading chains -Sam's Club and Costcodiffer with respect to their customer base. 10 Sam's Club has historically targeted small businesses, as evidenced by their former slogan "We're in Business for Small Business", while According to the store's website, Sam's offers Advantage Membership, Advantage Plus membership (which offers access to more discounts and greater cash back rewards on the affiliated credit card), Business Membership, and Business Plus membership. According to 9 Bates (1977 9 Bates ( [2002 ) offers an early discussion of the warehouse club format. 10 BJ's Wholesale Club, which operates primarily on the east coast, is another important player in the warehouse club market. For reasons discussed in the data section, we do not include BJ's in our empirical analysis and therefore do not discuss it here either. not strictly comparable as the two stores use slightly different terminology and slightly different definitions. For Costco, for example, "Food" is the sum of their category "Food" (21%), which is defined as "including dry and institutionally packaged foods," and their category "Fresh Food" (12%), which is defined as "including meat, bakery, deli, and produce." Sam's Club defines their category "Food" as "including dairy, meat, bakery, deli, produce, dry, chilled, and frozen packaged foods." 15 The data should be interpreted with caution, but they suggest that Sam's Club gets a much greater percentage of its sales from "Sundries," which it defines as "including snack foods, tobacco, alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages, paper goods, laundry and home care and other consumables" and which Costco defines as "including candy, snack foods, tobacco, alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages and cleaning and institutional supplies." Hardlines and softlines-called "hardgoods" and "softgoods" for Sam's Club-provide a greater percentage of throughout the rest of the paper, although some are actually multiple cities (i.e. Barre-Montpelier, VT) or entire counties. As a robustness check we later show that the results are not sensitive to dropping the multiple cities and counties from the sample.
We examine the effects of Costco, Sam's Club, and Walmart Supercenter on the prices of the 23 grocery items the ACCRA COLI reported consistently during our sample period. These products, which we describe in Table 2 , span a variety of different categories: starches, fruits and vegetables, meats, beverages, additives, and non-food items. We also conduct a falsification exercise that tests for "effects" of these stores on the prices of 9 non-grocery items described in Table 3 that big box retailers do not typically sell. 16 Whether warehouse clubs and Supercenters are among the stores surveyed in the ACCRA COLI is critical to the interpretation of the results. As noted by Basker and Noel (2009:982) (2008). 17 We updated these Walmart data through the end of 2007 using the store locators on Walmart.com along with press releases containing store and distribution center opening dates.
We also include other city-and county-level characteristics as controls in some 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our empirical analysis proceeds as follows. We begin by estimating the average effects of Costcos, Sam's Clubs, and Supercenters on the price of grocery items. Motivated by approaches used in the literature, we develop a baseline fixed effects model that we validate through a falsification test. We then evaluate the sensitivity of our baseline results through a wide range of robustness checks. Next, we examine the timing of the effect by including leads and lags, the former of which provides an additional test for endogeneity bias. Finally, we explore the possibility of heterogeneity on the bases of product and market characteristics.
Baseline Model and Falsification Test
Basker and Noel (2009) 
where ‫‬ ௧ is the price (in 2006 The dynamic model (4) allows for the estimation of both short-and long-run effects. The short run effects of Costcos, Sam's Clubs, and Supercenters are given by ߚ ଵ , ߚ ଶ , and ߚ ଷ .
Computing long-run effects requires considering that a store that entered prior to the current year impacts contemporaneous price not only through contemporaneous number of stores but also 18 OLS coefficient estimators in models with lagged dependent variables can be inconsistent if the errors are serially correlated (Keele and Kelly 2006) . We tested for serial correlation by compressing the data into a two-dimensional panel by computing average product prices in each city in each year, running an analogous regression to equation (4), and then performing the Arrelano-Bond test using the Stata module "abar" (Roodman 2004) . The test found only weak evidence of first-order autocorrelation (significant at only the 5% level despite the large sample size). When the extent of the autocorrelation is small, the bias is negligible in large samples (Keele and Kelly 2006) . We therefore estimate the model using OLS, and later conduct robustness checks to rule out the possibility that serial correlation is driving our conclusions.
through lagged price. If, for instance, a new Costco enters, the immediate effect on price is ߚ ଵ , the additional effect the following year is ߚ ଵ ߚ ସ , the additional effect the year after is ߚ ଵ ߚ ସ ଶ , then ߚ ଵ ߚ ସ ଷ , and so on. The total long-run effect of Costco is therefore given by the following geometric series:
The long-run effects of Sam's Club and Walmart Supercenter can also be computed by replacing ߚ ଵ with ߚ ଶ and ߚ ଷ . 19
The key identifying assumption in regression equation (4) is that changes over time in unobservable city-level characteristics affecting prices are uncorrelated with changes in Costco,
Sam's Club, and Supercenter presence. This assumption would be violated if, for instance, a positive demand shock both increases a city's grocery prices and makes it more attractive to big box retailers. Basker and Noel (2009) provide evidence to support the strict exogeneity assumption in fixed effects regressions with Supercenters from 2001-2004, but it is not clear that this generalizes to regressions with three stores and a longer time period. We therefore conduct a falsification test where we re-estimate equation (4) using non-grocery instead of grocery prices as the dependent variable. Since Costcos, Sam's Clubs, and Supercenters generally do not sell substitutes for the non-grocery items, a finding that any of these stores "affect" the prices of nongrocery items could be attributed to endogeneity bias, thereby calling into question the ability of the model to reveal causal effects on grocery prices.
We report the results for the baseline regression and falsification test in Tables 5. A new Costco is associated with a statistically significant increase in grocery prices of 1.4% in the short 19 See Basker (2005b) for further discussion of the derivation of long-run effects in this context. run and 2.7% in the long run. The effect of Sam's Club, however, is small and insignificant.
Walmart Supercenters reduce prices by a statistically significant 0.9% in the short run and 1.7%
in the long run. Our Supercenter estimates are in line with those obtained by Basker and Noel (2009) . We take this as evidence that, even though our ACCRA COLI data do not allow for the exclusion of Walmarts from the stores used to compute market prices, our estimates for Supercenters mostly reflect a competitive effect rather than Walmart's price advantage.
Importantly, the falsification test estimates small and insignificant effects of all three stores, providing preliminary evidence to support the baseline model. We next further test the validity of this specification by subjecting it to a number of robustness checks.
Robustness Checks
In this section we evaluate the sensitivity of the results from our preferred regression.
Our robustness checks fall into five categories: additional control variables, alternate specifications for the store variables, other methods of sample construction, longer lags of price, and instrumental variables.
In Panel A of Table 6 we report the results from re-estimating equation (4) including four different sets of control variables. First, we add interactions of each of the year fixed effects with city population. This addresses potential endogeneity bias from highly populated cities both experiencing differential price shocks and being more (or less) likely to attract big box retailers.
Next, we add interactions of the year fixed effects with median city income to capture differential trends in price between high and low income areas. Third, we control for the countylevel numbers of grocery stores and warehouse clubs or supercenters (besides our stores of interest) to help verify that our estimates reflect the effects of Costco, Sam's Club, and Walmart rather than overall retail structure. 20 This also addresses the possibility that the effects may be partly due to grocers going out of business when faced with competition from big box retailers.
Finally, we consider a more general approach to modeling differential trends by including cityspecific time trends, created by interacting each of the city fixed effects with linear year. In all four regressions, the estimated short-and long-run effects for each of the three stores remain virtually identical.
Panel B presents results from various alternative specifications for the Costco, Sam's Club, and Supercenter variables. These include the number of stores per 100,000 residents or 100 square miles in the city, binary variables reflecting the presence of at least one store in the city, and the number of stores in the county rather than the city. The first three reflect other measures used in the Walmart literature, while the fourth could potentially alter the results to the extent that big box retailers in outlying parts of a county draw customers away from grocery stores within the city limits. As shown in the summary statistics in Table 4 , the distributions for the store variables vary considerably depending on which specification is used, so the coefficient estimates are not comparable to those from the baseline model. However, we observe the same general pattern regarding signs and significance. Costcos consistently increase grocery prices, In Panel C, we show that the results are also robust to different sample construction rules.
Recall that cities move in and out of the ACCRA COLI sample over time, and that we use an unbalanced panel of the cities included in over half of the sample years. In the first row, we restrict the sample to those cities present in every year. This eliminates almost 2/3 of the sample and therefore increases the standard errors, but the coefficient estimates remain similar. The next two robustness checks drop the multiple cities and counties from the sample and use the first quarter of the following year (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) rather than the fourth quarter of the current year (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . Finally, we consider a more drastic change to the sample: instead of pooling the products, we compress the available information into one observation per city per year by computing both simple and weighted (by the shares given in the ACCRA COLI) average prices for the basket of grocery items. In all cases, the point estimates remain virtually identical.
The first three regressions reported in Panel D replace the lagged grocery price variable with longer lags of 2, 3, and 4 years and show that the results remain similar. These robustness checks address the concerns that serial correlation in the error term or measurement error in the price data may bias the coefficient estimator for lagged price, and that some of the bias could spill over into the coefficient estimators for the store variables. The correlation between unobservables that affect contemporaneous and lagged price should weaken with longer lags, so the fact that the results are not sensitive to lag length helps to alleviate this concern. The fourth row of Panel D drops lagged price completely. In this specification, the estimated short-and long-run effects are constrained to be the same and are represented by the coefficient estimates.
Dropping lagged price does not affect the conclusions reached.
We close this section by considering an entirely different identification strategy. Instead of attempting to control for the sources of endogeneity bias through city fixed effects, we attempt to purge the bias by using distance from the nearest Costco, Sam's Club, and Walmart food distribution centers (and their squares) as instruments for the three endogenous variables. 21
Distance to the nearest distribution center affects operating costs and therefore provides a source of variation in a city's store presence that is potentially uncorrelated with demand-side characteristics influencing price levels. A concern with this approach, however, is that distribution center and store presence may be jointly determined -a corporation may decide to open a series of stores in a potentially profitable area along with a distribution center to service those stores. Another limitation is that there is not enough variation over time in cities' distances from distribution centers for the IV estimates to be meaningfully precise in models with city fixed effects; we therefore do not include fixed effects in the reported IV regressions. Because of these limitations, we prefer to use the IV analysis as a supplemental robustness check rather than as our main approach.
Panel E reports the IV results, with the F statistics from tests of the joint significance of the instruments in the first-stage regressions in brackets. The second row adds population, population density, and median income as controls in an attempt to compensate somewhat for the lack of city fixed effects. In both regressions, the usual pattern emerges: Costcos significantly increase grocery prices, Supercenters significantly decrease them, and Sam's Clubs have no statistically detectable effect. The estimates for Costcos and Supercenters are larger than in the baseline regressions, though adding the control variables attenuates them slightly. The IV estimators do not perform as well as the baseline fixed effects estimators in falsification tests, however, so we consider the fixed effects results more reliable. Specifically, if we estimate the IV model with controls using non-grocery prices as the dependent variable, Costco's short-run 21 We considered a number of functional forms and the quadratic specification maximized the first-stage F statistics. The conclusions reached are generally not sensitive to the functional form used.
"effect" is a significant 1.5%. The difference between Costco's short-run impacts on grocery and non-grocery prices -which is perhaps better reflective of its true causal effect -is therefore 1.9%, well within the 95% confidence interval from our preferred fixed effects specification.
Timing
We next examine timing by adding leads and lags of the three stores. A finding that lagged Costco, Sam's Club, and Supercenter presence impact grocery prices conditional on current presence of these stores and lagged grocery prices would provide evidence that the timing of the effect is less smooth than the relationship given by equation (5). If the leads of Costco, Sam's Club, and Supercenters impact grocery prices and cause the estimated effects of contemporaneous stores to change, this would suggest the associations estimated in the preceding sections do not reflect causal effects -price levels are likely determining store entry instead of the other way around. 
Heterogeneity by Product
All regressions to this point have assumed the impacts of Costcos, Sam's Clubs, and Supercenters are the same across different products and markets. We relax this assumption in the final two sections of the empirical analysis, by examining first whether the effects are different for different products and then whether they depend on the size and retail landscape of the market.
We begin by stratifying the sample into product categories. First we split the sample into six categories representing starches, fruits/vegetables, meats, drinks, food additives, and nonfood items, as classified in Table 2 . We next divide the sample into products for which the ACCRA COLI specifies the brand to be sampled (cereal, peas, peaches, sausage, tuna, coffee, soft drink, shortening, parmesan cheese, margarine, tissue, and dishwasher detergent) and those for which it does not (bread, lettuce, bananas, potatoes, corn, steak, beef, chicken, eggs, milk, and sugar) . This categorization could potentially help explain the finding that competitors compete with Costco by raising prices instead of lowering them: if grocery stores respond to Costco entry by offering higher quality products, the price increase should be stronger among products for which the brand is not specified and therefore quality is not fixed. and drinks, while Supercenters' effects are strongest for starches and fruits/vegetables. Costco leads to slightly greater price increases for items where the brand is not specified, although a positive effect remains even when the brand is specified. These results suggest that competition along the product quality dimension explains some but far from all of Costco's effect. Table 10 stratifies on a finer level and presents regression results for each of the products separately. Though these estimates are relatively imprecise because of the small sample size, some interesting findings emerge. Costco's largest effect is on lettuce -an item where quality is especially variable -and it is also significant in the regressions for peas, corn, beef, eggs, tuna, coffee, soft drinks, milk, sugar, parmesan, and detergent. Though Sam's Club is insignificant for most products, consistent with the pooled results, it does lead to large and significant increases in the prices of potatoes and beef and a significant decrease in the price of shortening. Supercenters are statistically significant in every regression but lead to the largest price reductions (2% or more in the short run) for bread, potatoes, and corn.
Heterogeneity by Market Characteristics
We close our analysis by examining if the effects of new Costcos, Sam's Clubs, and
Supercenters differ depending on how many of them are already in the city, the city's population, or the number of grocery stores in the county per 100,000 residents. The competitive effect of Costco entry, for instance, may weaken with the number of Costcos already in the market if the new store steals business from existing Costcos as well as competing grocery stores. Additional warehouse clubs or Supercenters might also exert less competitive pressure in large cities where they represent a smaller shock to the market. Finally, big box retailers could have either stronger or weaker competitive effects in cities with high grocery store densities. On one hand, grocery stores in underserved areas may not need to make significant changes after warehouse clubs or Supercenters enter in order to continue earning comfortable margins. In this case, the competitive effect would increase with grocery store density. Alternatively, in fiercely competitive markets grocers may already be doing everything they can to differentiate products and target particular types of consumers, in which case the competitive effect would decrease with grocery store density.
We test for nonlinearity in the effects of Costcos, Sam's Clubs, and Supercenters by reestimating our baseline regression (4) adding the squares of the three stores. In Table 11 we use these estimates to predict the effects of the first, second, third, and fourth stores to enter the average city. (We stop at four as that is the maximum number of Costcos in our sample.) We also report the coefficient estimates in the table notes. Costcos have a relatively constant effect across the distribution, while the price reductions from Supercenters become weaker with each store. The first Sam's Club to enter a city leads to a small and marginally significant increase in prices, with further stores having no statistically detectable effect.
We test for heterogeneity on the basis of population by adding interactions of each store with city population to equation (4) and obtaining new estimates. Based on these estimates, we plot in Figures 1-3 the short-and long-run effects of Costcos, Sam's Clubs, and Supercenters on prices across the population distribution (up to approximately the 95 th percentile of 1,000,000).
On each figure, the thick solid line represents the estimated short-run effect and the thin solid lines represent the upper and lower bounds of its 95% confidence interval. Similarly, the thick dashed line shows the estimated long-run effect while the thin dashed lines give the upper and lower bounds of its 95% confidence interval. Figure 1 shows that Costco increases competitors' prices most sharply in less populated areas. In the smallest cities Costco increases prices by about 1.5% in the short run and 2.8% in the long run. This effect gradually diminishes as population increases, eventually becoming statistically insignificant at a population of about 350,000. In Figure 2 , the impact of Sam's Club appears to slightly rise across the population distribution, but at no point is either the short-or long-run effect statistically different from zero. Figure 3 shows that competitors in the smallest cities reduce prices by 1.3% in the short run and 2.5% in the long run in response to Supercenter entry. The effect diminishes as city population increases but remains significant throughout most of the distribution.
Finally, we examine heterogeneity on the basis of grocery store density by adding grocery stores per 100,000 residents as well as its interaction with each of the three store variables to regression equation (4). We display the results (up to the 95 th percentile of 130 grocery stores per 100,000 residents) in Figures 4-6. Figure 4 shows that grocers increase prices more dramatically when Costco enters markets that are already saturated with grocery stores.
The short and long run effects both become significant at about 28 grocery stores and level off at 1.8% and 3.4%, respectively, at over 100 grocery stores. The impact of Sam's Club also increases with grocery store density, as shown in Figure 5 , but is never significant in either the short or long run. Figure 6 shows that Supercenters' competitive effects also strengthen in more saturated markets, becoming significant at just over 20 grocery stores and eventually reaching a reduction of 1.4% in the short run and 2.7% in the long run.
CONCLUSION
Research by Basker and Noel (2009) has shown that competing grocers lower prices in response to competition from Walmart Supercenters. We provide evidence of very different responses to competition from warehouse clubs. Using a panel of cities from the ACCRA COLI and a dynamic fixed effects model, we find that Costco entry actually results in higher prices among incumbent grocers, while competition from Sam's Club has no statistically detectable effect. We conducted a variety of tests to increase our confidence that these relationships are causal, including a falsification test with non-grocery items; the addition of control variables, city-specific time trends, and leads of store presence; and the consideration of an instrumental variables strategy. We also examined heterogeneity on the bases of product type, order of store entry, and market population and grocery store density. Costco's effect is strongest for items for which the brand is not specified, and in sparsely populated cities with competitive grocery markets.
Our results are consistent with work by Ellickson (2004 Ellickson ( , 2007 showing that firms compete on the basis of quality. They also illustrate how firms' entrepreneurial and managerial decisions are multi-dimensional. Grocery stores may elect not to compete with deep-discount membership warehouses on the price dimension, instead focusing on the less price-sensitive consumers and providing a higher quality shopping experience, higher-end products, or greater convenience.
More Notes: Standard errors, which are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by city, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level. The "short-run effects" are the coefficient estimates for the store variables; the "long-run effects" are the coefficient estimates for the store variables divided by one minus the coefficient estimate for lagged price. All regressions include product*year and city fixed effects. (n=18438) 0.021*** 0.037*** 0.007 0.012 -0.013*** -0.022*** Meats (n=18433) 0.016*** 0.028*** 0.004 0.007 -0.009*** -0.015*** Drinks (n=9219) 0.017*** 0.034*** 0.002 0.004 -0.006*** -0.011*** Additives (n=12292) 0.010* 0.017* -0.0007 -0.001 -0.007*** -0.012*** Non-Food Items (n=6146) 0.008 0.010 0.004 0.006 -0.008*** -0.011*** Brand Specified (n=36871) 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.004 0.007 -0.008*** -0.015*** Brand Not Specified (n=33803) 0.017*** 0.031*** 0.003 0.006 -0.011*** -0.019*** All regressions include product x year fixed effects, city fixed effects, and lagged price. Standard errors are suppressed to save space; they are available upon request. See other notes for Table 5 . 
Costcos
Sam's Clubs Supercenters Short-Run Long-Run Short-Run Long-Run Short-Run Long-Run 1st Store 0.012** 0.023** 0.008* 0.015 -0.013*** -0.025*** 2nd Store 0.013** 0.026** 0.004 0.008 -0.011*** -0.021*** 3rd Store 0.015* 0.029* 0.0003 0.0006 -0.009*** -0.017*** 4th Store 0.017 0.031 -0.003 0.006 -0.006*** -0.012***
Estimates computed from regressions of ln(Price) on the number of stores and their squares, controlling for lagged price, product x year fixed effects, and city fixed effects. Standard errors are suppressed to save space; they are available upon request. See other notes for Table 5 . Coefficient estimates (standard errors) for the store variables: Costco 0.012 (0.007), Costco 2 0.0007 (0.002), Sam's 0.010 (0.004), Sam's 2 -0.002 (0.0005), Supercenters -0.015 (0.002), Supercenters 2 0.001 (0.0003).
Figure 1 -Marginal Effect of Costcos on ln(Price) by Population
Coefficient estimates (standard errors): Costcos 0.015 (0.007), Costcos*population -0.0018 (0.0015), Costcos*population 2 0.00006 (0.00004). 
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Figure 3 -Marginal Effect of Walmart Supercenters on ln(Price) by Population
Coefficient estimates (standard errors): Supercenters -0.013 (0.002), Supercenters*population 0.0015 (0.0007), Supercenters*population 2 -0.00006 (0.00004).
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Figure 4 -Marginal Effect of Costcos on ln(Price) by Grocery Store Density
Coefficient estimates (standard errors): Costcos 0.004 (0.008), Costcos*stores 0.0002 (0.0002), Costcos*stores 2 -8.27e-7 (6.70e-7).
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